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Michael Eric Dyson'
Thank you so much, Sister Tristan, for that very gracious introduc-
tion and to the dean for his eloquent remarks about the tone and
tenor of the debate in this nation around race as well as Brother Car-
los's insightful remarks about the struggle over race and jurispruden-
tial rationality to define where we are in the nation. It's just good to
be over here at the Law School. It's my first time over here. Lovely
for situation, as they say, and I look forward-I'll volunteer to teach a
class on critical race theory so I can just have an office up in here.
But I'm honored to be here today to think and reflect critically about
Brown v. Board of Education' and the intersection of race and law, and
I've got about a half an hour. So I used to tell a few jokes and talk
about Janet Jackson and Justin Timberfake-Timberlake, I'm sorry,
but I'll get right to the point this morning. Usually a half hour, I'm
just announcing my name, so I'm going to get right down to the brass
tacks and knuckles, so to speak.
I suppose if I were to give a title to my talk this morning, it would
be, "Can You Hear Me Now." Since Cyban Woodward, that august
and imposing historian of the South, said a title was a contract be-
tween a speaker and her or his audience, I think about Can You Hear
Me Now as the governing idea, not only of my talk, but in one sense
of the law. There's a lot of auditory language; there are great meta-
phors about seeing and hearing, but hearing especially-hear ye,
hear ye-or having court hearings or voir dires and so on. And
what's interesting to me is that this regulative metaphor of hearing,
the auditory capacity, in particular, is an interesting one that has shot
through legal language and jurisprudential rationality.
In a similar fashion that Richard Rorty points out, that within phi-
losophical discourse the notion of sight is critical to the foundation of
western epistemology in forms of knowledge;' so that Rorty suggests
this Cartesian notion of the mind being a glassy essence that reflects
back the reality objectively of what we comprehend has been govern-
ing idea within philosophical discourse for the last several hundred
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years.' And of course, along comes Rorty armed with [Ludwig] Witt-
genstein, [John] Dewey, and [Martin] Heidegger trying to challenge
the hegemony of the ocular centric metaphor, and especially trying
to challenge us to believe that philosophy is no longer a tribunal of
pure reason before which other disciplines must now genuflect in ac-
knowledgement of its technical superiority and its rational suprem-
acy;4 so that philosophy is no longer about the arcane, the underlying
structures of reason, and philosophy no longer adjudicates compet-
ing claims about what's true or right or beautiful or insightful or
good. And in essence, he says what: philosophy is part of the dia-
logue, it's part of-borrowing from the conservative philosopher, Mi-
chael Oakeshott-part of the conversation.
And if philosophy is part of the conversation, it doesn't have this
Archimedean objectivity outside which it exists outside of the human
experience, outside of human dialogue and language and possibili-
ties of thought, that it is part of the woof and warp of the very thing
we're trying to examine. So if that's the case, if philosophy doesn't
exist outside but inside, if philosophy is part of the conversation, then
it doesn't have a privileged sight from which it begins to make argu-
ments about reality. Well, taking my cue from all of that, you know,
arcane philosophical discussion about the differences between the
-vision shopping and the natural vision shopping and whether
human scientists can generate laws similar to the so-called natural
world, even though we deconstruct that kind of mythology as well be-
cause those laws themselves have been generated in the context of
arguments about history and science, which are themselves products
of human capacity to engage in rational reflection.
Having said that, it seems to me that it's important to say the law is
the same thing. We kind of mythologize the law. That is, those of us
who stand outside of it, oh my God, the law, we need a lawyer to even
do simple things like decide where we're going to teach and can we
get the contract in, or if somebody hit my car. Now I'm not here to
pronounce against an overly litigious society. I'm sure you all do that
over here enough. But what's interesting is that the law is an inter-
vening mechanism between human institutions and human beings,
and in that sense a mediating role is played by the law that needs to
be underscored. That mediating role then, that adjudicative role, to
be sure, has to be interrogated relentlessly. Questions must be asked
of it. What is the function and purpose of the law?
We hear the law, the law, the governing ideals that regulate dis-
course and plexus and behavior in human society. And at the same
time, we back up and say well, the developments of critical race the-
3 Id. at 17-127.
4 RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 160-74 (1982).
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ory, the developments of legal realism, the developments of, you
know, of critical theory forced us to back up and say maybe the law is
part and parcel of both the enlightenment that we should encourage
and the problems we have to overcome; or maybe part of the enlight-
enment that we have to overcome is part of the problem. Or the
enlightenment reason that uncritically celebrated misses out on other
stuff like history and tragedy and misery and tears and suffering, and
the way in which the law can both relieve that and reproduce that,
the pathology that we both want to examine and the very means by
which we examine the pathology. The law is implicated in the very
process of trying to examine the things that help and hurt us. So
when I want to think about, Can You Hear Me Now, I think about
those commercials with the cell phones and you get in the right posi-
tion, can you hear me now, and you step over this way, can you hear me
now, and I go further into this region, can you hear me now, can the
signal get through?
Part of what the law means to me is to help the hurt and misery of
human community be articulated in acceptable and tolerable institu-
tional frameworks that allow the perpetuation of justice. And that
means then that we have to take into account the perpetuation ofjus-
tice. And that means then that we have to take into account human
experiences often discounted, that's marginalized, that's overlooked.
And not only human experience but ways of thinking about human
situations in the law, and this has been brought home to me time and
time again, but especially recently in these University of Michigan
cases vis-A-vis affirmative action because we see that the folks' political
viewpoints ain't exempt from how they think about the law, even
though we got nine people sitting up on the Court trying to look at
and prognosticate about. And every jot and tiddle, every period,
every punctuation mark is scrutinized with deridian facility. What did
they mean? Did Justice Sandra Day O'Connor mean that in twenty-
five years affirmative action should be totally gone, should be wiped
out, should be excluded from the discourse and dialogue about race
in America, because in twenty-five years we're going to find some-
thing that we ain't found so far, which is the ability to just answer the
Rodney King questions and we all get along? Well, it's not simply can
we all get along but how do we get along, what are the resources at
stake, and could we have more women like Sandra Day O'Connor be-
ing explicit about their understanding that affirmative action quanti-
tatively has disproportionately enabled, catalyzed the upward mobility
of white brothers and sisters, especially white sisters, white women,
given the gender, and some white men and women, given the other
-category, the so-called formerly handicapped category.
When we figure all that stuff in, we say where were the white
women on the front line of the battle to not simply colorize affirma-
tive action and to not make it the exclusive predicate of those who
Feb. 2005]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
unfairly, through discourses of preferential treatment and reverse ra-
cism, now attempt to seize authority over those domains from which
they should be inherently excluded because we, we being the domi-
nant, we being the majority, the unspoken, the unscrutinized major-
ity, have access to that. Who told you that some black kid or Latino
kid sitting next to you in law school took your place? What kind of
logic informs that? What presuppositions philosophically construct
that consciousness such that the notion of merit and dessert are ine-
luctably tied to your position which is often unconscious, which is of-
ten unarticulated? And what critical race theory asks the law to do is
to come out of the closet, be it epistemic closet, the sociological
closet, the jurisprudential closet, and just own up to the fact that we
are human beings trying to make judgments about law and about be-
havior and about mediating relationships, and in terms of adjudicat-
ing these relations between human beings, and it's all implicated in
our human finitude limitation and as a result they are limited. Now,
what does that mean? That means for me then, fifty years ago Brown
vs. Board of Education,5 asked the law to be serious and explicit about
the struggle over race in American society that it had helped per-
petuate.
Think about 1896, Plessy v. Ferguson.6 Think about the fact that
black people had no rights that any white person was bound to re-
spect. That's in the law. That's huge, that's big time because that
means that that is written into the very fabric of the jurisprudential
culture from which we derive principles of behavior for human be-
ings and institutions, and that's big. So now we got to deal with the
fact that people's biases and prejudices informed them and of course,
we got oh, but of course, but of course we knew it then when the na-
tion was caught up in the dramaturgy of bigotry, and as a result of
that, inevitably and unavoidably these people bowed down at the
shrine of their own limited perspective. But of course, we now in the
twentieth century and into the twenty-first are somehow exempt from
those competing passions. Well, that may not be the case. So the re-
ality then is that when we think about the law's role, the law's role in
trying to get at some of these principles that we think are so impor-
tant-fairness and justice and equality and freedom-then we think
about the fact that the law has done an enormous good in terms of
setting the basis for how even schools operate in American society:
Brown fifty years ago. Before that, it was separate but equal. Who ac-
tually believed that? Who actually understood that to be the case?
That you could have separate, especially when you weren't funding
those schools equally. Even right now, we got sixty million dollar
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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schools out in the suburbs, mostly white communities, mostly privi-
leged communities, mostly very well-monied, well-heeled Tony com-
munities versus post industrial urban schools that don't even have
secondhand copies of see Dick run, see Jane look at Dick run, see
Spot look at both of them while Dick and Jane are running. Right?
Internet access out in the suburbs: you got super fast, super informa-
tion highway going down and you know, I don't know how old you
are, but back in my day, James Brown, Santa Claus, please come to
the ghetto.' Can the super information highway have an off ramp in
the barrio or in the hood? Right, we're trying to get some wire,
wired, wiring.
And so that means then that there are huge economic gulfs be-
tween the have gots and the have nots even today, and there have
been phenomenal notions out here that we've seen the resegregation
of American education along the lines of Brown in '54. Now there are
those who are stylishly bleak and hopelessly cynical who suggest that
oh, it didn't make a difference, what happened back with the Su-
preme Court in Brown only hurt African American and Latino and
other minorities. Oh, I don't think that's the case. We can make an
argument, and a legitimate one, that certain forms of integration
themselves have been paralyzing to a larger discourse of justice and
tolerance and diversity. We could argue that, but to suggest that that
wasn't huge, that when [Kenneth] Clark and Mamie Clark, the pro-
fessor at Columbia University, took those dolls, those black and white
dolls, and showed that these little - you little black people, black girls,
black children were unalterably drawn to those white dolls. 8 Not sig-
nifying that their preference was for one over the other without re-
spect of color; it was color coding. There was some kind of internal,
internalization of a kind of self abnegation that was evidenced in that
psychological test. And so, there was something huge.
Black people ought to want to see black dolls, not to be repulsed
by them, not to be turned off by them, not to believe that those dolls
were not beautiful. And when Ijoked earlier about Janet Jackson and
Justin Timberfake, I can't help but saying this, you know what I'm say-
ing, it's recent, it ain't got nothing to do with the lecture, but I got to
throw it in anyway. Well, it does, let me integrate it into the larger
fabric of my lecture. Here it is now, we got Janet Jackson, the black
breast, the black breast exposed at halftime. Oh my God, it's the
heart of American indecency. Now Michael Cow of the FCC-what
7 James Brown, Santa Claus Go Straight to the Ghetto, on FUNKY CHRISTMAS (Polydor Records
1995).
8 See Kenneth B. Clark, Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality Development
Presented at the Midcentury White House Conference on Children and Youth (1950) (support-
ing the Brown Court's recognition of the detrimental effect of segregation on black children).
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does that stand for-fools covering commercials? What does that
really stand for? The son, the sons and daughters of conservatives,
black conservatives are often much worse than their papas and ma-
mas because at least Colin Powell had some experience in Banana
Kelly [Housing Community] up in the Bronx where he was in the
hood. Right? He got some memory of that, and trust me, I hung out
with Colin Powell and Chris Rock before the Janet Jackson concert at
the Madison Square Garden. He ain't had no problem with Janet,
trust me. I can't speak on it. He did not have a problem with her
breast. That's all I'm saying to you. So now, her breast exposed is the
heart of American indecency. Now I can't help but believe - now
we're going to create law, now we want to say well, my God, we have
to have FCC regulations.
What's indecent is the way in which Clear Channel [Communica-
tions, Inc.] is overtaking American waves and commodifying Ameri-
can information.9 That's what's indecent. That's what you need to
be checking out for us because the billboards you see are from Clear
Channel. The venues that the live performance takes place is Clear
Channel, and the air waves upon which they speak is Clear Channel,
and - by a whole bunch of other right wing conservatives have ac-
cess because of Clear Channel. So those are the kind of indecency
issues we need to be interrogating that have to do with the collusion
between corporate capitalism and American public funded expres-
sion.
And so now Janet Jackson with that black breast.' ° I called him
Justin Timberfake. You want to be black until it costs you something.
You want to be a brother until it means that the materiality of your
racial identification causes you to suffer. Now what happened to the
old days? Maybe Mick Jagger and them, you know, the rock and roll
cat: yeah, I did it, wish I would have pulled the other one off. What
happened to that kind of transgression and rebellion? Now every-
body is genuflecting before the shrine of American corporate capital-
ism. And that white hand reaching across to grab that black breast is
something that's symptomatic of a history and trajectory of domi-
nance in American society. That ain't nothing new. And to exempt
yourself from responsibility is nothing new as well. And then Janet
Jackson, when that black female breast was used to suckle a white civi-
lization and to feed and nurture white supremacy, it was beautifully
9 SeeJeanne Anne Naujick, Clear Channel Starts Airwaves Cleanup, TENNESSEAN, Feb. 26, 2004,
at 1 ("Clear Channel owns more than 1,200 stations across the United States .... [and] reaches
110 million people through its own stations and millions more through its syndicated pro-
gramming.").
10 See CBS Apologizes for R-Rated End to Halftime Show, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 2, 2004,
at D5 ("Janet Jackson set off a Super Bowl firestorm on Sunday night when her right breast was
bared in their nationally televised halftime show duet with Justin Timberlake.").
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received. When that black female breast was exploited as a symptom
of slavocracy and Jim Crow law, that was exploited and that was the
deal and that was not harangued; that was not seen as the basis of in-
decency. But now, if any erotic independence is associated with that
black female breast, it becomes problematic. I don't know, that just
strikes me as kind of odd and interesting.
Back to my bigger point. So it seems to me then when we looked
at America vis-A.-vis Brown and look at the experiment with those dolls,
what strikes me is quite interesting then, is that the internalization of
this form of self abnegation suggests that there are elements that the
law has to take into consideration and into account. Can you hear
me now? So what degree can the law, should the law, the myths, the
stories, the identities of the very people that it intends to help, regu-
late and govern societally? So when I think about Brown, I think of
how significant that law was and how important the Supreme Court
has been when influenced by cultural values that acknowledge the
limitation of human reason and acknowledge that human bias has
been at the heart of the project of American jurisprudential reality.
Then when it acknowledges that, then we know that the law can play
a good, noble, ennobling, edifying role to help us deal with the real-
ity. We must hear the least of these. We must hear those who have
been historically excluded as a result of the rule of law.
The uncritical celebration of the law is just as dangerous as those
who would tend toward anarchy and lawlessness. The uncritical cele-
bration of law which suggests that the law itself without intervening
forces and without push or pull, without force from the broader soci-
ety, would it of itself make decisions that were just and appropriate? I
think about the fact that Brown took place in the culture where there
was a huge civil rights movement just looming. A year later Rosa
Parks in Montgomery, Alabama; Martin Luther King, Jr. a few years
later; Roy Wilkins already on the scene; A. Philip Randolph already
on the scene; Edie Nixon; Ella Baker; Joanne Robinson; and other
significant figures on the scene. So it seems to me a social move-
ment, a credible attempt to try to embody the ideals after which the
law aims must be a corollary to, and a check and balance of the law.
Because without that kind of serious social movement, the law itself
ain't done a whole bunch to deal with the realities that we want to see
addressed in our culture. And so, Can You Hear Me Now, can we
hear the misery and the hurt and the pain? Can we hear the cries for
justice that human beings who are American citizens have made in
the name of the ideals of democracy, of fairness, ofjustice and so on.
And so, the intersection of the law in race is critical, and I know
that a bunch of critical race theorists and other people who think
about these things are somehow suspicious and skeptical as if they're
doing something outside of the parameters of what we usually do
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when we teach constitutional law or torts and contract or when we
deal with civil aspects of the law. But they are part and parcel, woof
and warp, they are at the heart of these debates about not only criti-
cal race and reason, not only about what the law can do to help folk
become better human citizens, or at least allow them to arrange their
human relations in such a way that they reflect the ideas of justice to
which they adhere. We see that the law ain't that much different
from any other level of sophisticated conversation that gets involved
in what it means to be an American.
So that now, apart from questions of race, we've got added on top
of this stuff questions of nationality with the post-September 11
world. Now we're trying to figure out, can we balance civil liberty
with the protection of a certain kind of fabric of democracy that's
protected from, you know, these vicious and insidious arbitrary forms
of violence that terror represents. And the bottom line is, is that race
has been a kind of American terror and that the American terror of
race has not always been nobly dispatched with by the law. As a mat-
ter of fact, the law at points has perpetuated the terror of American
race. And how do we understand our relationship as practitioners of
that law, as people who help adjudicate what the law is intended to, as
those of us who help interpret what the law is about? Because if that
was self evident, we wouldn't need lawyers. If it was self evident, we
wouldn't need judges. Folk who disagree with one another, who
make bitter arguments against one another, who make bitter argu-
ments against one another in the name of and in defense of compet-
ing ideas about how to parse and interpret specific moments of that
law. So I'm always heartened to find law schools and lawyers and law
professors who are interested in trying to figure this stuff out, untan-
gle it, disentangle it, and help us understand that the law doesn't
stand above, but it's from within. And if it's from within, it has all of
the virtues and vices of being from within. So let's stop pretending
that it has this objective. I know, you all don't do that, but a whole
bunch of folk outside of here do, and they tempt you to want to be-
lieve that again, to reinvigorate that mythology and that narrative.
So the thing is, we want to deconstruct that, and after deconstruct-
ing it, what the law helps us understand, especially in race, is a perfect
case that underscores this point, is that we are no better or no less
than the ability to arrive at consensus and to deal with our debates in
a fundamentally humane fashion that owns up to the role we have
played in the hurting of human communities that appeal to the law
to justify their claims. And that to me is very important because visit-
ing a whole bunch of prisons where disproportionate numbers of
black and brown men and women are locked up. When I see affirma-
tive action working, that's the only place it's really working, is up in
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the prison industrial complex." We ain't running nothing else. Peo-
ple of color are women, right?
When we look at all of this paranoia that's been developed around
affirmative action, myjiminy, what's going on, byjing, what's happen-
ing to America. We've just given it over to these radical Marxists and
these - and these lesbians and these feminists and these crazy
people now, they want to get married and now the blacks want to
take-you know, all this paranoia. And I'm telling you, I'm out on
the road 150, 200 days a year. I don't see it. Where's it at, where is
that place, where is that school? You know, they tell you the schools
are running over. I ain't been to one. I have not been to an Ameri-
can institution where the mythology that's been generated by the
paranoia of protectionism, racial protectionism of the dominant cul-
ture is in effect. And furthermore (and I'll make a couple points and
end because I know I'm over my time), furthermore, that when we
think about affirmative action, affirmative action is not the ceiling,
it's the floor.
But we have so surrendered the social and political battle neces-
sary to be corollary to the legal one and it's moved so far to the right
that even conceding the legitimacy of affirmative action has to be
ameliorated by terms like let's mend it, don't end it. Even the friends
of those who are represented by affirmative action have to find new
language to try to defend it because it's such a tough time in America
right now. And part of the difficulty of defending affirmative action
is the difficulty of making, especially, our good white brothers under-
stand that many of them systemically and historically, not individually
but collectively, have benefited from a form of racial preference.
Dare I say is too obvious for me to point to. But the clich6 begs to be
engaged, that our own president, God bless his heart, brother come
out on Martin Luther King, Jr.'s birthday against affirmative action,
what, wow. Not the day before, not the day after, on the day, right?
And for all those who say to us we must appreciate the fact as African
Americans that we have Colin Powell and Condoleeza Rice in the
White House, what does that mean to us? Right? I'm not saying be-
cause they're house negroes, White House negroes, that we shouldn't
be proud of them. And what is it about black people whose names
with C that have a destructive impact on America? Colin and Condie
and Connelly and Clarence. I'm not saying it's a scientific alphabeti-
cal kind of relationship, but it's worth considering. So are we sup-
posed to be proud of the fact that they're smart, smart negroes? Like
1 See generally Eric Schlosser, The Prison-Industrial Complex, ATL. MONTHLY, Dec. 1998, at 51
(describing the increasing number of prisoners of color incarcerated for non-violent crimes,
the decreasing rate of violent crime, and the interplay of private companies in federal prison
budgetary allocations).
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we ain't never seen no smart negroes before, right? And what good
do they do in the White House in the presence of the president who
himself has benefited from forms of preference? Here's a guy [who]
couldn't even get into his local school, daddy got to call Yale. They
called Harvard [to] get him in. He admits on every graduation
speech he's a C student. I'm a C student and this is what C students
do, so all you cats making A's and B's, step aside, because the C stu-
dents rule and rank because we got the cash. And so now, here's a
guy benefiting from racial preference. By his own admission, he was
drunk [un]til he was forty. Then he got a job. What was he, he
headed the Texas Rangers and he sold Sammy Sosa to [the] Chicago
[Cubs]. That wasn't a great move. Then he was the governor [of
Texas], now he's the President. I know some negroes named Willie
in Detroit [who've] been drunk since they're forty, can't even get
elected as dog catcher. So when we have all this paranoia about af-
firmative action, please.
When we put it in broader context, we understand that affirmative
action is not about giving somebody a shot who doesn't deserve a
shot. And those of you who are engaged in the law, applying the law,
fixing the law, limiting the law, reconstructing, reconstituting the law,
must understand as you do understand the fact that those who are
victimized by the law must be defended by that very law. This is
where I would argue, quibble with the ingenious formulation of
Audre Lorde that the tools of the master can never dismantle the
master's house.'2 Got to do it, got to have it, got to master those
tools, got to engage in sophisticated forms of theoretical application
of the law to their social constructs. Yes, all that. The bottom line is
the master's tools got to be involved in dismantling the master's
house. But you got to baptize those tools, got to convert those tools.
Excuse me for that narrow religious reference, I am a Baptist
preacher and Saturday is close to Sunday, watch out. So it seems to
me that those tools must be deployed, must be skillfully engaged in
dismantling the master's house. That's why people of color and oth-
ers engaged in reflections upon the law and race ain't got no, ain't
got no, ain't got no choice but to engage in all kinds of discourses.
Right? I know people say oh, these obscurantists, jargon, written dis-
courses and stuff, we ain't got no choice. We got to master that and
the common tongue. We got to be able to say it for five minutes on
Bill O'Reilly and we got to be able to say it before the Supreme Court
and make some sophisticated arguments, and we got to go in law
journals and engage with habber mouths and - and [rappers]
Biggie Smalls and Snoop Dogg and whoever else comes to mind.
12 AUDRE LORDE, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in SISTER OUTSIDER
110 (1984).
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So for me, finally, I'll say this now for real. For me then, the law
in its relationship to race is critical to not only helping us hear more
effectively the cause and claims of those who have been victimized by
former deployments of interpretations of the law. But in the final
analysis, I contend that the law must be part of a larger humane
agenda of radical democracy. And sometimes that larger humane
agenda of radical democracy means we challenge the hegemony of
the law that we practice. Yes we acknowledge its benighted noble
status. We acknowledge that it has done grand and great things in
the hands of practitioners of a tremendous dexterity and skill. But at
the same time it has been used to hurt and harm a whole bunch of
folk and shut their voices down. So I come full circle. Can You Hear
Me Now? Of course, this dovetails nicely with other stuff I write
about when I think about the rapper Biggie Smalls who says, you
know, I used to "wonder why Christmas missed us/Birthdays [were]
the worst days/Now we sip champagne when we're thirsty/Damn
right I like the life I live because I went from negative to positive.'
3
But you don't hear me though. Hearing that experience or a guy like
Tupac, I wrote a book on Tupac, Holler If You Hear Me,14 holler if you
hear me. He said just the other day "I got lynched by some.., cops
and to this day/ [those] same [cops] on the beat get[] major pay/but
when I get my check they['re] takin[g] tax out/so we['re] payin[g
the cops] to knock the blacks out."
15
You ain't got to be in Marxism 101 with Antonio Bromchey and
cultural interpretation to understand that you're subsidizing your
own oppression and that people who have not been heard by the law
often hear the pain, the heartache of their fellow brothers and sisters
and as a result articulate that; and what the law should do is to pick
up on that and embrace that, amplify that, put it through it's own in-
terpretive sieve, but come up with some credible intellectual justifica-
tions to expand the larger humane project and agenda of radical
democracy. Because if it fails to do that, it ultimately fails to serve us,
and if it fails to serve us, we are its servants. And we were not made
for the law, the law was made for us, and if that's the case, who is the
us being defined by the law and how can we expand the corporate
consciousness that informs what that us is so that every person deserv-
ing of protection will find it under the cover of law. Thank you very
kindly.
13 THE NOTORIOUS B.I.G.,Juicy, on READY TO DIE (Bad Boy Entertainment 1994).
14 MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, HOLLER IFYOU HEAR ME: SEARCHING FOR TUPAC SHAKUR (2001).
15 2PAC, Point the Finga, on STRICTLY 4 MY N.I.G.G.A.Z. (Amaru/Jive 1998).
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